The Cassini orbiter is the largest and most complex interplanetary spacecraft ever built. Since attaining orbit around Saturn in the summer of 2004, Cassini, along with its Huygens probe, have been continually improving our understanding Saturn, its satellites, its enigmatic rings system, and of the solar system. One of the hallmarks of the CassiniHuygens Project is the close working relationship between the many teams required to operate such a sophisticated spacecraft. Their ingenuity has enabled them to find new and different ways to improve their processes during Cassini's prime 4-year orbital tour. This paper will discuss the relationship between Cassini's Navigation and Spacecraft Teams and the work required to properly configure Cassini's telemetry system for Navigation. A detailed explanation of how the Navigation Team utilizes spacecraft telemetry and analysis demonstrating the benefits will also be provided. Finally, telemetry requirements for Navigation for future missions will be addressed.
I. Introduction
Since the summer of 2004, the Cassini spacecraft orbiting Saturn has been working around the clock collecting historic science data and returning it to Earth. The science results have been well documented in papers, journals, mass media, and websites. What is not as extensively documented is the creativity and adaptability of the Cassini Project flight team members to continually improve the manner in which they operate the spacecraft.
There are many teams within a project such as Cassini, each with respective responsibilities vital to the success of the mission, and each who must forge close working relationships. This paper will discuss in particular the relationship between the navigation team & the spacecraft operations team, especially the Attitude & Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS), and how continual collaboration between the two teams dramatically improved the spacecraft's performance and the process in which the spacecraft is flown. Much of the joint effort between the two teams has been spent addressing AACS's growing concern for the health and safety of the Reaction Wheel Assembly (RWA).
A major source of the improvement for Navigation operations was from an extensive reconfiguration of the AACS telemetry. Examples of how the Navigation team makes the most of the AACS telemetry and its advantages will be presented. Finally, based on the experience gained from Cassini, requirements of how to configure telemetry in order to better serve Navigation's needs for future missions will be offered.
II. Cassini-Huygens Mission & Navigation Background
Cassini-Huygens, a joint mission between the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA), and the Italian Space Agency (ASI), was launched on 15 October 1997 on a Titan-IVB. After a seven-year interplanetary journey, the spacecraft successfully achieved orbit around Following the achievement of Huygens, Cassini embarked on its remaining 3.5 year, 70-orbit Saturnian tour to study the composition, structure and dynamical processes of Saturn's atmosphere, magnetosphere, rings, and satellites. It is believed that the complex dynamic processes that formed the Saturnian system are similar to those that created our solar system. In addition, it is also believed that Titan holds fundamental clues to the evolution of life on Earth. Scientists have referred to Titan as "a young Earth in a deep-freeze." The rich organic chemistry on Titan's surface is much like what scientists think existed on Earth before life developed. Also, Titan's atmosphere, a dense yellow smog made up of nitrogen and methane, is much like that of Earth in her primordial days.
Saturn's other satellites are also of great interest to Cassini scientists. They vary drastically in shape, size, age, and origin. Many show the cratered scars from billions of years of heavy bombardment, while others appear to be smooth by comparison and are believed much younger. Some show evidence of tectonic activity and one moon in particular has been revealed to be geologically active. Enceladus captured the imagination of the Cassini project, and the world, when it was discovered that Enceladus is the fourth geologically active body in the solar system, and the second body to have water geysers. This fascination has directed the mission to utilize about 20% of the targeted flybys to study Enceladus further in the 2-year extended mission (compared to about 6% during the 4-year prime mission).
The Navigation Team's role with the project can be broken down into three areas: 1) trajectory design; 2) orbit determination (with optical navigation); and 3) maneuver design. These three elements work together to ensure that Cassini achieves its science objectives.
Trajectory design establishes the orbital tour of the Saturnian system. The tour includes the sequence of targeted flybys and orbital geometries to meet the diverse set of science objectives. Orbit determination (OD), amongst other things, estimates the current state of the spacecraft using radiometric data and predicts how well the spacecraft is charting along the designed reference trajectory. In addition, optical navigation is utilized in the OD process in order to improve the ephemerides of the major Saturnian satellites, and thus improve the knowledge of the spacecraft's relationship to the satellites. Given the reference trajectory and the estimated spacecraft state from OD, the maneuver design team determines the required change in velocity (∆V) in order to correct any trajectory deviations and return the spacecraft back on its proper course. Further details of these elements can be found in Buffington, et al 1 , Antreasian, et al 2 , and Williams, et al 3 . Cassini's trajectory design includes 53 targeted flyby encounters of Saturn's largest moons, most of which are low altitude flybys of Titan (950-1300 km), along with a handful of higher altitude Titan flybys and icy satellite flybys (50-11000 km). Even though the time between targeted flybys is as little as 16 days and as much as 48, science is collected and played back nearly every day between flybys. This poses additional challenges to balancing the overall science objectives with spacecraft operations, especially scheduling activities required to maintain health and safety of critical spacecraft hardware, and minimizing the impact of these activities on navigation operations.
III. Relationship between Spacecraft Engineering & Navigation

A. Orbit Trim Maneuvers
A close relationship between spacecraft operations and navigation exists within every deep space mission. At the most basic level for the Cassini-Huygens Project, the Navigation Office (Nav) schedules opportunities for three Orbit Trim Maneuvers (OTMs) between targeted encounters, and it is the responsibility of the Spacecraft Office (SCO) to execute any OTMs deemed necessary by Nav.
These three OTMs are broken down as follows (see Figure 1 for illustration 3 ): a) "Cleanup-OTM" is typically about three days after the targeted encounter (may be longer if there are multiple orbits between flybys). This maneuver is used to correct any spacecraft trajectory prediction errors from the previous satellite flyby due to mis-modeling. This OTM may also have a deterministic component to it as a part of a two-maneuver optimization strategy for the next targeted encounter.
b) "Apoapsis-OTM" is used to shape the spacecraft trajectory properly in order to achieve the desired conditions for the upcoming flyby. This maneuver can have a significant deterministic component and may be designed in conjunction with the cleanup-OTM in order to optimize propellant usage.
c) "Approach-OTM" is typically about three days before the targeted encounter. This maneuver serves as the last control point to realign the spacecraft trajectory to the desired flyby conditions. The spacecraft may have deviated from its intended trajectory due to errors from the previous OTM, as well as any prediction errors from small force events since the last OTM, and orbit determination dispersions. This OTM is a purely statistical maneuver (i.e., there is no deterministic component). Given the purely statistical nature of the approach-OTM, this maneuver has the greatest likelihood of being canceled of the three. SCO is able to perform the OTMs with either the 445-N bipropellant Main Engine (ME) or the 0.9-N monopropellant Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters that are aligned along the z-axis of the spacecraft (see Figure 2) . The only use of the ME is for trajectory control. However the RCS thrusters aligned with the y and z-axes are also used for other science and engineering activities. Therefore, in an effort to minimize the use of monopropellant, OTMs greater than about 0.3 m/s are performed using the ME.
All OTMs execute in the following similar manner. First the spacecraft rolls about the z-axis, keeping its fixed High Gain Antenna (HGA) pointed at Earth, to an intermediate attitude. This is followed by a yaw turn about the y-axis, away from Earth-point, to the final burn attitude. This two-turn method ensures that no thermal constraints are violated. Once the two "wind turns" are complete, the engine of choice performs the main burn. After the burn is completed, the spacecraft "unwinds" the yaw turn followed by "unwinding" the roll turn, returning the spacecraft to its original Earth-pointed attitude. 4 Even though all OTMs fit into this basic pattern, there are some differences between ME and RCS OTMs that have an impact on Nav.
For OTMs requiring the ME, the RWAs must be powered off during the firing of the ME. So after the roll turn to the intermediate Earth-pointed attitude, the RWAs are spun down, causing disturbance torques on the spacecraft. As the disturbance torque perturbs the spacecraft attitude, the RCS thrusters fire to keep the HGA pointed at Earth. Not all of Cassini's eight RCS thrusters are balanced when they are fired. To control the spacecraft's attitude about the z-axis, the four thrusters along the y-axis fire as coupled pairs, thus imparting nearly no ∆V on the spacecraft. However, the four thrusters along the z-axis, which are used to maintain the spacecraft's attitude along the x & y axes during the RWA spin-down, are uncoupled. As a result, the z-thruster firings do impart a small ∆V.
After the RWAs are turned off, the uncoupled z-axis thrusters are then used to perform the y-axis yaw turn to the final burn attitude. As this slews the spacecraft away from Earth, Nav has no visibility into this small ∆V. While at the final burn attitude, an unbalanced 0.9° offset turn is induced to correct for a mounting misalignment of the ME gimbal actuators. 5 The offset ensures that the burn vector will be properly aligned in the direction specified by Navigation's maneuver design.
Following a ME burn cutoff by the AACS accelerometer, each turn is unwound in reverse order using the unbalanced z-axis thrusters, beginning with the 0.9° offset and then the yaw turn. All of these small ∆Vs from using the un-balanced z-axis thrusters to turn have an impact on the spacecraft trajectory and need to be into account during the maneuver design process. After the unwind yaw turn has completed and tracking of the spacecraft has been re-established, the RWAs are turned on and spun up to some intermediate rate, again imparting a small ∆V. After this, attitude control is transferred from the RCS back to the RWA, and the unwind roll turn places the spacecraft and the RWA rates at their desired end state as determined by AACS. 4 OTMs executed using the RCS thrusters operate a little differently. The RWAs are not required to be powered off during the firing of the RCS. Therefore, the roll and yaw turns necessary to place the spacecraft at the burn attitude are done using the RWA (no 0.9° offset turn is required for the RCS). Only the RCS thrusters along the zaxis are fired and the entire ∆V that takes place is at the burn attitude and there are no other small force ∆V events necessary. Most of the time, during the same tracking pass, AACS will also execute an RWA bias (RWA biases will be discussed in the next section). The RWA bias executes while the spacecraft is at Earth-point.
B. RWA Biases
Outside of these OTMs planned during the seven-year interplanetary cruise, AACS occasionally requires additional health and safety events for the Reaction Wheel Assembly. These activities also result in imparting a
Figure 2. Cassini-Huygens Spacecraft
"small force" ∆V on the spacecraft from the RCS thrusters. They include "RWA Momentum Biases" and "RWA Friction Tests" performed by AACS.
For many other spacecraft, periodic RWA momentum unloads are required because external torques cause the RWA to accumulate momentum over time. However, that is hardly the case with Cassini. While it is true that Cassini is a 3-axis stabilized spacecraft and uses its RWA to maintain attitude control, external torques for sources such as solar radiation pressure and thermal radiation pressure from the radioisotope thermoelectric generators have a very small effect on the spacecraft. Therefore there is no need to simply dump momentum. Rather, Cassini manages its RWAs in a different manner.
Since Cassini has no scan platform, all of its remote sensing science instruments are attached to the spacecraft frame. As a result, the RWAs must be used frequently in order to slew the spacecraft from one science attitude to the next. These slews place a heavy toll on RWA usage and AACS must continually manage the RWA in order to optimize their performance and protect the hardware. The primary method of management employed is to bias the RWAs to a set of initial rates as selected by optimization software. Also, the science pointing profile is scrutinized in order to determine how often the RWAs need to be re-biased.
During RWA biasing activities, the spacecraft transitions to thruster control. As the RWAs are spun up to attain their set of pre-selected spin rates, the RCS thrusters fire in order to maintain the spacecraft attitude that has been perturbed by the disturbance torques from the RWA. Depending on which axis of the spacecraft attitude is exceeding the deadband limit, either a pair of coupled y-thrusters fire or the uncoupled z-thrusters fire. Recall the coupled thrusters do not impart a ∆V, whereas the uncoupled thrusters do.
RWA bias activities typically occur while the spacecraft is Earth-pointed and has radiometric tracking. However, recently increased concern over the RWA health and safety has caused AACS to explore executing biases while there is no ground visibility. In the past, the Navigation Office would have had a greater issue with performing "biases in the blind" as it would decrease the precision of the OD solutions and increase the uncertainty. But due to the positive results from the use of spacecraft telemetry in Navigation processing, concerns over the impact of "blind biases" on the OD solution have decreased. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
C. RWA Friction Tests
AACS performs RWA biases in order to maintain RWA health. In order to monitor the health of the RWAs, AACS performs friction tests. In these tests, the RWA are spun to a specified spin rate and then they are simply allowed to coast down to 0 rpm. Given the orientation of the RWAs on the spacecraft, if they coasted down at precisely the same rate, then the spacecraft attitude would not be perturbed and thus no z-thruster firing would occur. However, since they are coasting down at different rates, then the spacecraft attitude is disturbed and the zfacing thrusters fire causing ∆V.
At the start of the orbital tour in 2004, these RWA friction tests occurred two to three times annually. As concern for the health of the RWAs increased, not only have the number of RWA biases increased, but it was also requested to double the frequency of the RWA friction tests. The increased number of RWA biases and RWA friction tests brought on a set of scheduling challenges for the Navigation team.
The dramatic increase of the number of RWA friction tests required a significant integration strategy between the Nav and SCO. Given the short timelines between target satellite encounters and the OTMs associated with them, guidelines were established to properly place these new RWA friction tests.
Given the decreased ability to accurately predict the amount of ∆V from the friction tests, they were placed between cleanup-OTMs and apoapsis-OTMs. This was done in order to maximize the possibility of cancellation of the approach-OTM. Tracking requirements between these two OTMs also limited the opportunities to execute the friction tests. The rationale for the tracking requirements is to be able to gain sufficient radiometric data to resolve the OTMs and the RWA friction tests. And finally, since Cassini is ostensibly a science mission, these additional engineering activities needed to be placed in such a manner that minimized their impact on science collection.
Since RWA biases are required to maintain the health and safety of the RWA, looser considerations are made compared to the RWA friction tests, which monitor the RWA health and safety. Namely, RWA biases are permitted to execute between apoapsis-OTMs and approach-OTMs. In general, ∆V predictions for RWA biases can be determined fairly accurately, within 10%. Also, since the ∆V from RWA biases are significantly smaller than the RWA friction tests, the tracking requirements for the RWA biases are more relaxed. And finally, since the Cassini science community recognized that maintaining the continued good health of the RWAs is vital to their ability to collect science data into the extended mission, they have also been willing to accept more impact on their data collection.
D. Science Related Events
Besides OTMs and other AACS-related activities, there are science-related events where AACS operations affect navigation. Low altitude Titan flybys are especially challenging to spacecraft operations due to the impact of atmospheric torques on the spacecraft. In order to protect the spacecraft from tumbling, AACS transfers attitude control of the spacecraft from the RWA to the RCS because the RCS has more control authority to counteract the atmospheric torque. The momentum is unloaded from the RWA before the spacecraft encounters Titan's atmosphere and, once Cassini is safely out of the atmosphere and in no danger of tumbling, the RWAs are initialized to a new set of biased spin rates and attitude control is transfer back to the RWA. All of the uncoupled thruster firings under RCS control during these low altitude Titan flybys result in ∆V on the spacecraft. This has an impact on the OD solution, which will be discussed in part C of the "Utilization" section of this paper.
Since the start of the orbital tour, one instrument, the Radio and Plasma Wave Science (RPWS) instrument, has noticed increasing interference from the operation of the RWAs. Early in the mission, the RWAs did not affect the electric field channels of the RPWS. But, at present, they represent a noise source a factor of 1000 above the electric field sensitivity threshold of their channels at frequencies below about 2 kHz.
* As a result, they made a request that, at locations for high priority science, the RWAs be turned off while their data is being collected. In order to accomplish this, AACS must again transfer attitude control from the RWA to the RCS. However, unlike the periods of low altitude Titan encounters where the RCS slews the spacecraft and maintains attitude in the presence of drag torques, the RCS in this activity is only required to preserve an Earth-pointed attitude for a few hours. 6 This results in an order of magnitude less ∆V than in the case of the Titan-targeted flybys.
E. Configuration of Cassini Telemetry to Better Suit Navigation
Prior to Cassini-Huygens entering orbit around Saturn on 30 June 2004, spacecraft telemetry was exclusively used to characterize and calibrate the behavior of spacecraft hardware, monitor the performance and health of spacecraft hardware and software, and diagnose spacecraft anomalies as they occurred. Of course, once the orbital tour began, spacecraft telemetry was still used in a similar manner as before. But as Cassini engaged in its campaign flying into Titan's atmosphere, spacecraft telemetry, particularly AACS telemetry, was occasionally reconfigured in order to determine the atmospheric density 7, 8 . AACS changed the precision of the ∆V telemetry in order to better assess the performance of the spacecraft during OTMs and other small force ∆V activities. Originally, AACS set the ∆V telemetry to report 2-mm/s per telemetry unit. This was so that AACS could observe how much ∆V the ME generated during maneuvers without risk of overflowing the telemetry counter. The respective telemetry channels in EME2000 coordinates would peg at 1000 m/s with a resolution of 2-mm/s per telemetry unit. The 2-mm/s resolution for the ∆V telemetry allowed AACS to capture the ME performance for the three largest maneuvers in the mission: the 450 m/s Deep Space About three-quarters of the maneuvers between launch and the probe mission were less than 20 m/s in all three of the EME2000 axes, and all but the three large maneuvers mentioned earlier were less than 50 m/s. However, AACS did not want to frequently update its flight software (FSW) in order to change the resolution of the ∆V telemetry. Changing FSW is always a risky proposition, so there was no practical justification to make multiple changes to the FSW during interplanetary cruise. It is preferable to make a change like this to FSW only once.
After successful completion of the Huygens Probe portion of the Cassini-Huygens Mission, in May 2005, AACS updated the ∆V telemetry resolution to 0.04-mm/s per telemetry unit. This allowed for a max ∆V telemetry in any of the EME2000 coordinates to be 20 m/s. Of the nearly 140 OTMs remaining in the prime mission, only two would exceed this ∆V telemetry limit, and AACS handled those OTMs when appropriate with direct memory readouts of the ∆V addresses in AACS FSW. For AACS, higher fidelity ∆V telemetry allows them to better characterize their ME and RCS thruster performance during OTMs.
With regard to the other small force ∆V activities, the majority of them are on the order of tens of mm/s (or even smaller). The exception is the ∆V during low altitude Titan flyby, where the ∆V can be a couple of hundred mm/s. Increasing the fidelity of the ∆V telemetry allows AACS to better determine the density of Titan's atmosphere, to better assess the subsystem's performance during these events, and to better gauge the accuracy of the predictive capabilities of these events.
Even though the rationale for this change was for AACS to better evaluate their ∆V predictions, reporting with greater precision how much ∆V AACS telemetry is estimating has been an unexpectedly great resource for Navigation. Besides improving the resolution of the ∆V telemetry, the frequency of the ∆V telemetry was increased during OTMs. Navigation's uses and benefits of both will be discussed in greater detail later in the following section.
Another piece of AACS telemetry was later identified by Navigation to be of benefit. AACS telemetry reports the duration of RCS thruster valves actuation (i.e., RCS thruster on-time). However the frequency at which this data was being sampled was too sparse to be of any use to Navigation. Navigation requested AACS to increase the sample rate of RCS thruster on-time telemetry by a factor of 32 (from a sampling rate of every 512 seconds to every 16 seconds). Since AACS shares the engineering telemetry stream with other SCO subsystems, AACS is allocated a certain amount of bandwidth. AACS was generous enough to reduce the sampling rate of lower priority telemetry in order to free up the bandwidth necessary to meet Navigation's request.
IV. Utilization of AACS telemetry for Navigation
A. Editing Radiometric Data During Small Force ∆V Events
As mentioned earlier, most small force ∆V events occur while on Earth-point and when 2-way radiometric tracking is available. To recap, these events include: RWA spin-down and spin-up during ME-OTM events; RWA biases; RWA friction tests; RWA spin-down, Earthpointed deadbanding while under RCS control, and RWA spin-up during specified RPWS data collection periods. Executing these events during 2-way tracking allows for a precise estimation of their ∆V by the OD team.
The OD team models the thrusting due to these small force events as impulsive maneuvers, where the ∆V magnitude and pointing are estimated. Figure 3 shows the 2-way Doppler residuals of a typical RWA bias event. The Doppler measures the spacecraft's Earth-line-of-sight velocity relative to the tracking station, and the residuals display the difference between the observed tracking data and the computed data based on the dynamic model of the spacecraft's motion. When the residuals lie along the zero-line, then the modeling is in agreement with the tracking data. Conversely, when the residuals move away from the zero-line, then there is some mis-modeling with the computed data. In the case of these small force events, the mis-modeling exists because these activities are not truly impulsive in nature, but rather occur over a span of time. This is clearly indicated in Figure 3 by the Doppler points with boxes around them. As the RCS thrusters fire, the Doppler residuals start to move below the zero-line. The sudden spike in the Doppler indicates where the impulsive model is applied. The amplitude of the spike is roughly equivalent to the magnitude of the ∆V that was modeled. The Doppler points that move down back toward the zero-line indicate additional thrusting. Once the thrusting has completed, the Doppler signature is no longer present. The difference between the period of flat Doppler residuals before and after the impulsive maneuver model represents the amount of Earth-line ∆V prediction error in the model.
As can be seen in Figure 3 , the impulsive maneuver model used for the RWA bias cannot properly resolve the Doppler where RCS thrusting occurs. Therefore, in order to make the data fit the impulsive maneuver model, all points as a result of The RWA friction test is the most stressing case where utilizing AACS thruster on-time telemetry is used. In general, this technique has not been necessary for RWA biases, as demonstrated earlier. This methodology has also been applied to ME-OTMs and RPWS data collection periods where it has been important to distinguish between thrusting due to attitude control deadbanding and RWA spin-down/spin-up events.
There have been two main benefits from using the AACS thruster on-time telemetry: 1) it has removed all ambiguity from determining when the spacecraft is and is not quiescent from small forces; and 2) it has provided for more accurate estimation of the ∆V of the small force events.
Navigation's estimate of ∆V has been fed back to SCO and AACS as another means for them to monitor and assess the spacecraft's performance and to evaluate the ability to predict the impact of the small force events. Prior to the execution of these small force ∆V events, AACS provides predictions to Navigation so that the ∆V of the event and its uncertainty can be properly modeled. Navigation relies on accurate ∆V predictions for mapping the spacecraft trajectory to encounters for future maneuver designs.
One manner in which the feedback of Navigation ∆V estimate has been used by SCO to improve spacecraft operations has been with estimating the thrust magnitude of the RCS.
B. Estimating RCS Thrust
The Propulsion Module Subsystem team's responsibility within SCO is to monitor the performance and maintaining the health and safety of the Main Engine and RCS thrusters. Key elements to their duties include tracking propellant consumables and estimating the thrust of the ME and RCS. Close tracking of propellant consumables is vital so that the spacecraft's mass properties are always up to date. Also, since the RCS utilize the single blowdown propellant tank, close tracking of the RCS monopropellant is required for their models to provide an accurate estimate of thrust.
An accurate estimate of spacecraft mass and the RCS thrust is important because RCS-OTMs, unlike ME-OTMs, do not use an accelerometer to terminate the OTM. Rather, the AACS FSW uses a timer to specify cutoff based on Newton's 2 nd Law of Motion (Eq. 1).
where ∆V commanded = requested ∆V from the OTM sequence s/c_mass FSW = PMS-determined spacecraft mass loaded in AACS FSW F FSW = PMS determined RCS thrust loaded in AACS FSW ∆t calculated = required duration of all four z-facing thrusters After the OTM has executed, AACS telemetry has been found to be a better source for the "a priori value" of the pointing used to seed the OD process than the true a priori value from the original maneuver design. Figure 13 is a slide from the AACS "quick-look" analysis presentation following OTM-149.
14 This slide displays the ∆V, as reported by AACS telemetry, for every event within this ME-OTM.
The events in red correspond to ∆V that occurred while the spacecraft was off of Earth-point. The line in blue indicates the ∆V delivered by the Main Engine. At the bottom of the slide, AACS also provides its estimate of spacecraft pointing during OTM-149. Updated uncertainties are derived from comparisons of the telemetry to the reconstructed maneuver pointing. Details of this telemetry-based uncertainty model can be found in Roth, et al. 15 OTM-149 is chosen as an example because there were only four tracking passes until the final design for the next maneuver, OTM-150. OTM-149 is the cleanup-OTM from the Enceladus-3 encounter, and OTM-150 is the apoapsis-OTM that targets the Titan-42 encounter 19 days later. A fast transfer between targeted encounters forces the Navigation team under time pressure to resolve the previous OTM's effect on the trajectory in preparation for the next OTM. Figure 14 shows the B-plane plot of the OD solutions leading up to OTM-150 with radiometric data cutoffs for each solution listed in the label. The center of the ellipse on the B-plane represents the spacecraft's predicted position relative to the target satellite at the time of closest approach. The ellipse is the 1-σ dispersion due to trajectory errors and uncertainties in the modeling of future events. The blue ellipses represent solutions based on the OTM-149 maneuver design for spacecraft pointing during the OTM with the Gates model for the uncertainty. The green ellipses represent solutions using the AACS telemetry estimate for spacecraft pointing as the a priori value and using uncertainties consistent with Roth's telemetry-based uncertainty model. Both sets of solutions map the spacecraft trajectory forward to the next Titan encounter. of people with expertise in multiple areas and the project is flexible enough when an improvement to an existing process is identified.
Many future missions are limited in their resources to the extent that they do not have the benefit of a large flight team to implement the changes similar to the ones that Cassini required. Consequently. it would be beneficial if future missions were able to take the lessons learned from Cassini and tailor them to meet their needs.
Of course designing a "nav-friendly" spacecraft with only coupled balanced thrusters is most desirable. But an engineering compromise typically made by the spacecraft design team is to have thrusters that are uncoupled.
Whether the spacecraft has coupled or uncoupled thrusters, early identification of engineering and science activities that can impact navigation needs to be made. This will allow the Navigation team to have a greater input on the scheduling of the activities. Navigation benefited greatly from the exercise in 2005 to take the responsibility to work with the spacecraft and science teams to reschedule all the RWA friction tests in the middle of the prime mission. Navigation was able to take the experience gained and apply it early on in the planning for Cassini's extended mission just as the downlink schedule was being negotiated.
Once the activities that impact Navigation have been identified, Navigation can then place requirements on the spacecraft team to properly configure telemetry to meet their needs prior to launch. Since the primary use of spacecraft telemetry is to monitor the health and performance of the spacecraft (especially during test, launch, and initial checkout phases of mission operations), the spacecraft might not be able to launch with the telemetry configuration that is best suited for Navigation. The Cassini Navigation Team was very fortunate that AACS was able to identify measurements that were of lower priority to free up bandwidth for newly identified higher priority telemetry. If Navigation establishes their telemetry requirements as early as possible during spacecraft development, then the spacecraft team can ensure that the telemetry system will be flexible enough to be reconfigured at a more appropriate time.
It is far preferable to have the proper telemetry configuration established for Navigation pre-launch rather than hoping for a reconfiguration post-launch. For missions with a short cruise phase, such as those to Mars, there really is no time to reconfigure telemetry.
It would be fair to say that ∆V telemetry is paramount to characterizing any propulsive event. This becomes even more important if the mission expects many such ∆V events to occur without any tracking station coverage. Ideally, the resolution of ∆V telemetry should be at least the same order of magnitude, if not better, that the uncertainty in the Doppler measurements. The Cassini Orbit Determination team is able to estimate the ∆V via Doppler to about 0.010 mm/s for RWA biases and less than 0.10 mm/s for RWA friction tests and other small force events; the resolution of the AACS ∆V telemetry is 0.04 mm/s.
The accuracy of the ∆V telemetry depends on how the flight software calculates it. The spacecraft team's ability to accurately estimate spacecraft mass and thruster output is critical to the ∆V telemetry. Therefore, as many small force events as possible must be scheduled over tracking coverage. Precise estimation of ∆V via radiometric tracking data is required for the Navigation team to independently validate the ∆V telemetry and the propulsion estimate of thrust. This is the only way to gain confidence in the accuracy of telemetry for when tracking data is not available.
When small force propulsive events do occur over tracking coverage, thruster on-time telemetry should be required. Knowing thruster on-times removes any ambiguity in distinguishing between Doppler points that have shifted due to thrusting and points that are noisy.
The sampling rate of thruster on-time depends on the nature of the spacecraft's attitude control system. For example, the more frequently the spacecraft is expected to deadband, the greater the telemetry sampling rate needs to be. Also, the telemetry sampling rate should be less than the Doppler count time. When the Cassini thruster ontimes were being sampled every 512 seconds, processing 60-second Doppler data from RWA friction test was challenging. It was nearly impossible to clearly correlate which Doppler points displayed thrusting. Increasing the frequency of the thruster on-time telemetry to every 16 seconds makes processing the Doppler during RWA friction test faster and more reliable.
Science teams already require that spacecraft attitude telemetry as a high priority. For missions where small body-fixed accelerations have a significant impact on Navigation, be sure that the software is created to easily fill in any telemetry gaps with predicted attitude data.
The last requirement for future missions is to have at least one member of their team act as the "Navigation Systems Engineer." The spacecraft team typically has a number of systems engineers who understand enough about the spacecraft subsystems that they can make sure that all the pieces of the spacecraft are working well together. That role is lacking in general with most other Navigation teams.
It is very important to have members of the Navigation team who understand the relationship between the spacecraft engineering operations and navigation. It should be a level of understanding that goes beyond the rudimentary knowledge of what the spacecraft engineering team is doing. Rather, a Navigation Systems Engineer should understand the fundamental needs of both sides such that they can effectively and positively influence operations on both sides of the fence. It would be most beneficial to have members of the Navigation team and members of the Spacecraft team cross-train in order to gain that understanding.
VI. Conclusion
The use of spacecraft telemetry has greatly improved how the Cassini Navigation Team operates. The Orbit Determination process is more refined, especially during small force events. More accurate estimations of ∆V have led to improvement in the modeling for the RCS thrusters. Improved calibrations of RCS thrust give confidence to the accuracy of the ∆V telemetry during periods when tracking data is not available. And accurate ∆V telemetry has made it possible for OD solutions with reduced uncertainties to be generated quicker than before. The higher precision OD solutions have provided greater confidence when under tight time constraints to design a maneuver and to the decisions whether to cancel or execute maneuvers.
The success of the Cassini Navigation Team to expand the use of telemetry will hopefully serve as a call to future missions.
